I'm an Assistant Professor at CEMFI. My primary research interests are in financial intermediation and corporate finance.
Recent / upcoming presentations
- Aug 202612th IWH-FIN-FIRE Workshop on „Challenges to Financial Stability” discussion
- Jul 2026NBER Summer Institute: Capital Markets and the Economy
- Jun 2026BSE Summer Forum discussion
- May 2026BIS-CEPR-Gerzensee-SFI Conference on Financial Intermediation
Research
Working Papers
Banks use synthetic risk transfers (SRTs) to offload potential losses in their loan portfolios to non-bank investors while retaining the loans on their balance sheets. We investigate this trillion-euro market using transaction-level data from the euro area, the largest SRT market, and highlight three channels of potential risks to financial stability. First, we causally show that banks synthetically transfer loans that are capital-expensive relative to their riskiness. As banks redeploy the freed capital, they become effectively less capitalized. Second, after entering an SRT, banks reduce their monitoring efforts compared to other banks lending to the same firm. Third, banks and non-bank investors are interconnected. Banks are more likely to sell SRTs to investors to which they also grant credit, and total bank credit to these investors increases before the SRT investment, suggesting that SRTs are partially debt-financed. The investors' leverage, however, remains modest.
Including scheduled; all presented by me.
- NBER Summer Institute: Capital Markets and the EconomyCambridge, USA2026
- BIS–CEPR–Gerzensee–SFI Conference on Financial IntermediationGerzensee, Switzerland2026
- BdE–CEMFI Conference on Financial StabilityMadrid, Spain video2025
- ECB–New York Fed Conference on Nonbank Financial InstitutionsFrankfurt, Germany2025
- 11th IWH–FIN–FIRE Workshop on "Challenges to Financial Stability"Halle, Germany2025
- NYU Stern Brown Bag Lunch SeminarNew York City, US2025
- BIS–ECB–CEPR conference on "Technological innovations in financial markets – Risks and opportunities in banking and regulation"Frankfurt, Germany2025
- HEC Paris Finance PhD WorkshopParis, France2025
Banks can grant loans to firms bilaterally or in syndicates. We study this choice by combining bilateral loan data with syndicated loan data. We show that loan size alone does not adequately explain syndication. Instead, banks' ability to manage risks and firm riskiness drive the choice to syndicate. Banks are more likely to syndicate loans if their risk-bearing capacity is low and if screening and monitoring come at a high cost. Syndicated loans are more expensive and more sensitive to loan risk than bilateral loans are. Our findings contradict the belief that reputable borrowers graduate to the syndicated loan market.
presented by me
- IBEFA conferenceSan Francisco, US2025
- Tri-City PhD WorkshopFrankfurt, Germany2024
- Banca d’Italia, Collegio Carlo Alberto and Norges Bank conferenceOslo, Norway keynote2024
- Finance in the Tuscan HillsFlorence, Italy2024
- 8th Annual Workshop of the ESCB Research Cluster on Financial StabilityRome, Italy2024
- 5th Financial Economics MeetingParis, France keynote2024
- Banco de EspañaMadrid, Spain2024
- Central Bank of IrelandDublin, Ireland2024
- Humboldt University of BerlinBerlin, Germany2024
- Toulouse Business SchoolToulouse, France2024
- University College DublinDublin, Ireland2024
- University of MunsterMunster, Germany2024
- University of PaduaPadua, Italy2024
- Swiss Finance Institute Research DaysGerzensee, Switzerland2023
- UZH Brown Bag Lunch SeminarZurich, Switzerland2023
- ECB Internal Research SeminarFrankfurt, Germany2023
Works in Progress
- Reporting Biases in Syndicated Loan Data
Syndicated loan data from commercial databases are widely used in academic research, but they typically cover a non-random sample of loans and only report information at origination. We study the resulting biases by merging DealScan with AnaCredit, the ECB’s mandatory credit registry. DealScan covers only 20% of syndicated loans in AnaCredit, and reporting is highly lender-specific. Using only DealScan and standard balance-sheet data, we can predict loan reporting very accurately, which allows us to propose a practical method to correct the sampling bias. We apply this method to the settings of 11 papers that use DealScan and show that the correction changes the estimates substantially. Tracking loans after origination, we find that lead arrangers that retain a larger share at origination sell more of it subsequently, whereas no such relationship exists for non-lead participants. This is consistent with lead arrangers holding excess loan supply that they sell shortly after origination.
- Why do Banks Synthetically Transfer Loans?